INTRODUCTION
There has been a debate whether the Brazilian football clubs should conduct their activities like a business or a company. The absence of professionalism in football for many years is nowadays reflected mainly throughout the enormous debts incurred by the largest Brazilian football clubs. For Brazilian football clubs, the adoption of the good practices of governance could bring an enormous contribution to their professionalism, increase their revenues and decrease their administrative problems.
In Europe, some football clubs have shares listed on the stock markets. In the United Kingdom, where some football clubs experience the stock market, the relation between good governance practices and the club's management is well documented. Michie and Oughton (2005) argue that good governance is essential for clubs who want a more efficient administration.
In Brazil, the literature on corporate governance is vast, but it is mainly focused on companies. Not much is known about the governance of sports organizations, such as football clubs. Rezende et al. (2009) create a corporate governance index for football clubs, which is composed by 50 questions that can be answered using public information from the financial statements, by-laws and websites of Brazilian football clubs. The authors analyze 27 clubs in 2008 and argue that good governance practices can improve their capacity to aggregate value to football´s business.
Our paper creates a football club governance index (FCGI) based on a reduced version of Rezende et al. (2009) 's index. We select 18 (out of 50 questions) in order to have an index that can be calculated retroactively. Our FCGI is leaner, more objective, and allows us to realize an analysis for a large number of clubs during a long period of time. In addition, we innovate by analyzing the relation between the football club's governance, and their financial and sports performances.
We analyze 20 large Brazilian football clubs from 2005 to 2010 and find that clubs with good governance present better financial performance (revenue and return on assets). Further, we also document that football clubs with good governance achieve better sports results (number of championships domestically and abroad).
LITERATURE REVIEW
Corporate governance is not new a topic and has been studied since the early research on the ownership structure of Berle and Means (1932) , who find that dispersed ownership is not common in many countries. La Porta et al. (1999) study the separation between ownership (cash-flow rights) and control (voting rights) in several countries, and show that only a few firms are widely Moreover, most companies are owned by families or by the state. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Morck et al. (1988) study the agency conflicts and ownership structures and how they can impact firm valuation. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al. (1998 Porta et al. ( , 2000 Porta et al. ( , 2002 show that the conflicts between shareholders and management, and the misalignment of interest between controlling and minority shareholders can be detrimental to the company. Claessens et al. (2000) evaluate the ownership and control structure in East Asia and provide evidence of concentrated ownership in the hands of single and multiple owners. Moreover, they find that companies vastly use indirect structures and nonvoting shares to separate control from ownership, especially at family-controlled firms and smaller firms.
There are many studies that show a positive relation between corporate governance, firm value and performance (Gompers et (1998, 2000, 2002) examine the effect of ownership structure and corporate governance on firm valuation, and document that better shareholder protection is associated with higher firm valuation, and with more developed capital markets in the countries.
Despite the vast literature on governance in companies, the research on governance and performance of football clubs is sadly lacking. An interesting experience involving football clubs and corporate governance was the initial public offer (IPO) of some European football clubs in the stock markets. Although the listing of football clubs on the stock market does not mean necessarily the adoption of good governance practices, this phenomenon can change their management, image, establish new partner relationships, sponsorship, and corporate communication. These factors constitute fundamental directives for the ability to generate cash for sports teams.
The presence of football clubs on stock exchanges forces clubs to adequate themselves to the corporate world. A well-known benchmarking is the Manchester United case, mainly because it became one of the most succeeded club in the football industry at the turn of the century, after his entrance in the stock market in 1991. The club experienced a more professional management, accounting transparency, and new sources of revenue generation. Thereafter the club conquered many championships (Leoncini, 2001 ). Michie and Oughton (2005) show examples of good governance in big and small football clubs, either listed or non-listed on stock exchanges. They propose the idea of creating a specific code of governance practices for football clubs in order to meet the interests of those directly involved in this sport business activity. Michie (2000) reports that a task force was created in 1999 to investigate the relation between corporate governance and the negotiation of football club's stocks, mainly because the shareholders of football clubs are not only institutional investors, but mainly individuals that are team's supporters. Considering that these supporters' interests should be respected, one conclusion of the task force was the recommendation for these small investors to take part in the clubs elections to nominate board members on their clubs.
In Brazil, football clubs are associations and not companies, so they do not list on stock exchanges. Adopting good governance practices should have a significant impact on the performance of football clubs in Brazil. An example that was introduced by Brazilian law was the mandatory disclosure of accounting information. This was extremely important for improving transparency and for accounting standardization.
Ishikura (2005) states that there were many problems before the law, such as a lack of rigour in the form of accountability, and no requirement for external auditing. Araújo (2003) shows that some football clubs created their own criteria and financial statements to improve results in the most convenient way for themselves.
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where FCGI is the governance index for football club, REV is the total revenue for each club, ASSET is the total asset for each club, ROA is return on assets (net income divided by total assets), CHAMP is the quantity of championships won by each club with the following weight: 1 point (state championship), 5 points (Brazil Cup), 10 points (Brazilian Championship), 20 points (American ChampionshipLibertadores) and 30 (World Championship). The weights for the different championships are subjective, so we define it according to the difficulty in obtaining them. State championships are the easiest ones, whereas the world championship is the most difficult. We also test the same weights for all championships as well as weights with smaller differences between the championships (1 for the state, 2 for Brazil Cup, 3 for Brazilian Championship, 4 for American Championship and 5 for World Championship), but our results do not change significantly. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this research. The total revenue of Brazilian football clubs is on average R$ 75.35 million (median of R$ 61.26 million) and ranges from R$ 12.01 million to R$ 194.71 million. The same behaviour holds for total assets, which have an average of R$ 201.55 million (median R$ 194.43 million), and vary from R$ 12.52 million to R$ 672.97 million. Brazilian football clubs have low profitability, and the average and median ROA are negative (-13% and -6%, respectively). The quality of governance practices of Brazilian football clubs is very low. The average (median) FCGI is 6.60 (8.00) out of 18 possible points. The club with the best governance practices has a score of 12, which represents 66.67% of the maximum. It's also noteworthy also that there are clubs that have FCGI of zero.
RESULTS
With respect to sports performance, the average and a median number of championships are low (1.67 and 0.0, respectively). In addition, there are clubs with no championship during the sample period. In contrast, some clubs have achieved excellent performance, with a maximum score of 31, including the world championship. Table 3 shows the correlation matrix of the variables used in this study. The correlations of FCGI with the other variables are positive: revenue (0.36), ROA (0.25), championships (0.08) and assets (0.05). These results seem to indicate that football clubs with better governance are larger, more profitable, have higher revenues more championships. We classify the football clubs in two groups according to their FCGI (good and bad governance). Table 4 shows the average, median and the p-values of the parametric and nonparametric tests of differences to evaluate if there are significant differences between the variables of both groups.
There are significant differences between football clubs according to their governance. When we compare clubs with good governance (average FCGI of 9.28) against clubs with bad governance (average FCGI of 3.92), we note that clubs with good governance have higher revenues (average of R$ 88.22 million against R$ 48.72 million), more championships (average of 2.35 against 0.98), bigger ROA (average of -10% against -18%) and more assets (average of R$ 216.19 million against R$ 173.20 million). All differences (except in ROA) are statistically significant at 1%, 5% or 10%. Table 6 shows the panel regressions using the number of championships of the club as the dependent variable. The governance is positively related to a number of championships in every model at 1% of significance. The club's revenues and assets are positively related to a number of championships at 1% and 5%, respectively. Therefore, we can conclude that the governance of the club has a positive effect on the number of championships, even after controlling by its revenue and size. Table 7 shows the panel regressions using ROA as the dependent variable. The coefficients of FCGI are positive and statistically significant at 1% in all models, which shows a positive relation between ROA and governance. This effect holds even when we add club assets and revenues. These two variables also are positive and statistically significant at 1%, revealing that bigger clubs are more profitable. 
CONCLUSION
The finance literature point on corporate governance usually documents a positive relation between the quality of governance practices and performance in companies. Is this result also valid for football clubs? The objective of this research is to measure the quality of governance of football clubs and determine whether there is a significant relation between governance, financial and sports performance.
We build an index to measure the quality of governance practices for football clubs based on the methodology of Rezende et al. (2009) . Our index is composed of 18 questions that can be answered from public information and allows us to realize an analysis for a large number of clubs during a long period of time.
We hand-collect data and measure the quality of governance practices of 20 large Brazilian football clubs from 2005 to 2010. Our findings show that there is a positive relation between football clubs´ governance and performances in financial terms (revenue and return on assets) and in sporting terms (number of championships in state, national and international levels). We cannot conclude that a causality relation exists, only that there is a positive association between governance and performance of football clubs in Brazil.
We also find that club size (measured by revenues and assets) is positively related to governance, so it may be the case that bigger clubs, which have more economic power, can attract better players and governance is improved as a consequence of the sporting results they are going to yield. Our fixed-effect regressions control for club size, so we argue that there is a positive relation between governance and performance even after controlling for club size.
Our study focuses only on Brazilian football clubs during a short sample period. It would be useful to extend this analysis for other countries and for longer periods of time to evaluate whether our conclusions hold for other markets. Moreover, our index is composed of only 20 questions that can be answered objectively. Future research could do qualitative analysis and interviews with club stakeholders to validate the results.
